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BANKRUPTCY LAW
OVERVIEW
A record number of bankruptcy petitions were filed in the bank-
ruptcy courts under the appellate jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals for the fiscal year October 1, 1983 to September 30, 1984.
In that period, debtors filed 23,062 new petitions.' For the fiscal years
1981-82 and 1982-83, there were respectively 20,086 and 22,191 new
cases filed. 2 The increasing number of appeals from the bankruptcy
courts to the Tenth Circuit reflects this heavy caseload. This survey will
focus primarily on the published opinions which were handed down by
the Tenth Circuit within the survey period.
Many of the cases discussed in this survey contain issues raised by
the numerous changes, legal and judicial, in the bankruptcy system since
the 1898 Bankruptcy Act was repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978. 3 Several cases deal with the impact of state law on federal bank-
ruptcy law. Where pertinent, this survey notes further changes in the
bankruptcy system due to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 19844 on July 10, 1984.
I. JURISDICTION AFTER MARATHON
A. Background
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 established a new bankruptcy
court system which gave bankruptcy judges the authority that was previ-
ously shared by bankruptcy referees and federal district judges. 5 The
old system established by the 1898 Act was wasteful and inefficient.
6
Cases were referred from the courts of bankruptcy (the United States
district courts and territorial district courts) to the bankruptcy referee.
The referee was given jurisdiction over the case "subject always to a
1. Telephone interviews with Clerks of Bankruptcy Court, Tenth Circuit (November,
1984).
2. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Statistical Analysis and Reports
Division, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics, A-47 (1982), A-43 (1983).
3. "The term 'Bankruptcy Code' is often used in connection with Title II of the
United States Code as amended by Public Law No. 95-598. The numerous provisions of
Public Law No. 95-598 that amend Title 28 of the United States Code have no common
name or designation and will be referred to simply as ...the Bankruptcy Reform Act."
Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court Under the New Bankruptcy Law: Its Structure and Jurisdiction, I I
ST. MARY'S L.J. 251 (1979), reprinted in 55 AM. BANKR. L.J. 63, 66 n.20 (1981).
4. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
5. See Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53 (1982).
6. The years of study that lead to the passage of the 1978 Inkruptcy law made clear
that the two major failings of the prior bankruptcy referee sysiin were Ihe lack of simplic-
ity in determining jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and the low starius and lack of power
of the bankruptcy judges which resulted in disrespect for their position and inability to
attract the best caliber judges. 130 CONG. REC. 7490 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement
of Rep. Edwards).
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review by the judge" of the bankruptcy court. 7 The referee was also
responsible for administrative duties under section 39a of the 1898 Act.
The system resulted in duplication of effort and mixed judicial and ad-
ministrative functions.
In order to make the bankruptcy process workable and efficient, the
1978 Reform Act abolished the referee system and created a newly
structured and independent bankruptcy court. Congress hoped that the
new system would attract highly qualified applicants to the judicial posts
established, and that the role of these judges would be limited to judicial
functions, thus resulting in increased fairness and less bias than under
the referee system.8 Also, in recognition of the specialized nature of
bankruptcy and for the sake of judicial economy, the new bankruptcy
court was given a pervasive grant ofjurisdiction. 9
There was one major problem with the 1978 Reform Act-the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by the bankruptcy courts was unconstitutional. In
June 1982, in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. ,'1
the Supreme Court held the jurisdictional component of the new system
unconstitutional because article I bankruptcy judges were adjudicating
rights and claims that only article III judges could constitutionally de-
cide. " The ruling was prospective only, and the Supreme Court gave
Congress over three months to remedy the situation.' 2 When Congress
failed to act, the Judicial Conference of the United States proposed a
model interim operating rule which split jurisdiction between the dis-
trict courts and the bankruptcy courts, depending on whether the case
arose under title 11 or was a civil proceeding "related to"' 13 cases under
7. 11 U.S.C. § 66 (1976) (repealed 1978).
8. H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Pts. I and 11 (1973).
9. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (1982).
10. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
11. Id. at 87. U.S. CONST. article III, section 1 states:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Serv-
ices a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in
Office.
It is well established that the "good Behavior" language means that article lII judges shall
be appointed for life terms, "subject only to removal by impeachment." Marathon, 458
U.S. at 59 (citing Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955)). Under the Reform Act, how-
ever, bankruptcy judges were appointed to 14-year terms and their salaries could be ad-
justed downward by Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982) (14 yr. term); 2 U.S.C.
§§ 351-361 (1982) (salary adjustment).
For a more detailed analysis of the Marathon decision see Redish, Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L.J. 197 (1983).
12. Marathon, 458 U.S. 87-88. Judgment was stayed to afford Congress an opportu-
nity to "reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or to adopt other valid means of adjudication,
without impairing the interim administration of the bankruptcy laws." Id. at 88.
13. Consistent with Marathon, the interim operating rule defined related proceedings
as follows:
Related proceedings are those civil proceedings that in the absence of a petition
in bankruptcy could have been brought in a district court or state court . . ..
Related proceedings do not include: contested and uncontested matters con-
cerning the administration of the estate; allowance of and objections to claims
against the estate . . ..
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title 11. In "related to" proceedings, a bankruptcy judge could only
make findings and recommendations concerning a judgment. 14 A judg-
ment became final only upon being signed by a federal district judge. 15
This split of jurisdiction for bankruptcy issues led to a flood of liti-
gation regarding what was and was not a "related to" proceeding. The
Tenth Circuit rendered two decisions within the survey period which
dealt with this split of jurisdiction and its effects.
B. Oklahoma Health Services Credit Union v. Webb
In Oklahoma Health Services Credit Union v. Webb, 16 the Webbs filed a
joint chapter 13 petition and a chapter 13 plan. Prior to the petition, the
appellant credit union had repossessed the Webbs' automobile upon
their default in payments. The chapter 13 plan called for the return of
the automobile to the Webbs with a provision under the plan to cure the
default and to resume the required payments. The bankruptcy court en-
tered an order confirming the plan and a second order calling for the
return of the automobile to the Webbs.
The credit union appealed both orders. 17 It challenged the juris-
diction of the bankruptcy court, arguing that in Marathon the Supreme
Court, by invalidating the jurisdictional provision of 28 U.S.C. section
1471(c) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, had also invalidated 28
U.S.C. section 1471(a) and (b).18 Subsections (a) and (b) relate only to
the grant of jurisdiction to the district courts; subsection (c) relates to
the pervasive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. 19
The Tenth Circuit joined other circuits in rejecting this argument.
2 0
It held that the split ofjurisdiction under the interim operating rule was
valid because the district courts retain primary jurisdiction over bank-
MODEL RULE: JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, reprinted in A. HERZOG & L.
KING, COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION BANKRUPTCY CODE 665 (1983).
14. See A. HERZOG & L. KING, COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION BANKRUPTCY CODE 665
( (d)(3)(b)) (1983).
15. Id. at (e)(2)(A) and (B).
16. 726 F.2d 624 (10th Cir. 1984).
17. Id. at 625.
18. Id.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982) reads in part:
Jurisdiction:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a
court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title II or aris-
ing in or related to cases under title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11 is com-
menced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by this section on the dis-
trict courts . ..
20. See Salomon v. Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574 (2d Cir. 1983); White Motor Corp. v. Ci-
tibank, N.A., 704 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1983); First Nat'l Bank of Tekamah, Nebraska v. Han-
sen, 702 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3539 (1983); Braniff Airways, Inc.
v. CAB, 700 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 944 (1983); see also Coastal Steel
Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
349 (1983).
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ruptcy matters. 2 ' It also rejected the argument that the subject matter
of the orders was controlled by state law and that the case was a "related
proceeding." '2 2 It found that the subject matter of the orders was based
on the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, the bankruptcy court had juris-
diction to enter a final order.
C. In re Colorado Energy Supply, Inc.
A procedural issue arising out of the interpretation of "related to"
proceedings under Marathon was raised in In re Colorado Energy Supply,
Inc.23 Following the sale of debtor's property, debtor's landlord, Price,
applied for immediate payment of his claim for rent from the sale pro-
ceeds. The claim was disallowed as a cost of sale. Following the entry of
judgment by the bankruptcy court, Price filed a notice of appeal and a
motion for extension of time for filing a notice of appeal with both the
bankruptcy and district courts. The appeals were denied as the time pe-
riod allowed by Bankruptcy Rule 802 for filing the notice of appeal and
the motion for extension had expired. 2
4
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Price claimed that the Bankruptcy
Rule 802 time period was not applicable to his case. 2 5 Alternatively, he
claimed that his failure to file timely under Rule 802 was due to excusa-
ble neglect which he explained had resulted from confusion over the
applicable procedural rules due to the Marathon decision.2 6
If the matter was a "related to" proceeding, the Bankruptcy Rule
802 time period was inapplicable because the judgment would be final
and appealable only after being signed by a district court judge.2 7 If
however, the proceeding was one arising under title 11, the time period
for appeal would run from the entry of judgment by the bankruptcy
judge and that time period would have expired. The court noted that
Price was attempting to keep his claim alive by seeking a broad interpre-
tation of Marathon so as to obtain a ruling that the bankruptcy court had
no jurisdiction to render a final order regarding his alleged "related to"
claim. 28 The Tenth Circuit found the issue to be purely a bankruptcy
matter and again, as in Webb, joined other circuits in narrowly interpret-
ing the Marathon decision.2 9 Finally, the court held that the late filings
of the notice of appeal and motion for an extension of time were not due
21. 726 F.2d at 625.
22. Id. at 625-26.
23. 728 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1984).
24. Former Bankruptcy Rule 802 required that a notice of appeal be filed with the
clerk of the bankruptcy court within 10 days of the date of the entry of the appealed judg-
ment, order, or decree. A request to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal must
have been made before the time for filing a notice of appeal expired except that a request
made no more than 20 days after the expiration of the time for filing a notice of appeal
may have been granted upon the showing of excusable neglect.
25. 728 F.2d at 1284.
26. Id. at 1286.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1285.




D. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
Subsequent to the holdings in Webb and Colorado Energy Supply, Con-
gress passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984 ("BAFJA") 3 i creating a solution to the problems arising out of
Marathon. Title I of BAFJA contains jurisdictional provisions; Title II
creates 85 additional district and circuit court judgeships; Title III
makes significant changes in the Bankruptcy Code in the areas of con-
sumer credit, rejection of labor contracts, discharge of debts incurred by
drunk drivers, repurchase agreements, time share agreements and bank-
ruptcies of grain storage facilities and shopping centers. The new court
structure created by BAFJA parallels practice under the interim operat-
ing rule so closely that it is fair to say the new provisions are in many
respects a codification of the interim rule.
3 2
Jurisdiction of the district court is set forth in 28 U.S.C. section
1334(a) and (b) 33 as amended, which parallels former 28 U.S.C. section
1471(a) and (b). As under the interim rule, practice under BAFJA is
premised on district court jurisdiction of all title 11 cases and related
proceedings with reference of any and all cases to the bankruptcy judge
for the district. Bankruptcy judges may enter judgment on core pro-
ceedings 34 arising under title 11 but may only propose findings and con-
30. Id. at 1286.
31. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
32. Special Report: Highlights of H.R. 5174, CURRENT AWARENESS ALERT, 1984 Issue 5,
Part II, at 49 (July, 1984).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1984) provides in part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a
court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall have original
but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title !1, or
arising in or related to cases under title 11.
34. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(2) (West 1984) defines core proceedings as follows:
Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or exemptions from
property of the estate, and estimation of claims or interest for the purposes of
confirming a plan under chapter 11 or 13 of title II but not the liquidation or
estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death
claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
() objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmations of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash
collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from
claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the
estate; and
1984]
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clusions to the district court regarding a proceeding that is non-core but
is otherwise related to a case under title 11.
There are also provisions for distinctive treatment of certain pro-
ceedings. Upon timely motion of a party, the district court must abstain
from jurisdiction of a state law claim or cause of action, and the decision
to abstain is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.3 5 Personal injury
and wrongful death claims are also singled out for distinctive treatment.
These claims must be tried in the district court in which the bankruptcy
case is pending or the district court in the district in which the claim
arose.3 6 The mandatory abstention rules do not apply to personal in-
jury and wrongful death suits.
A negative view of the new bankruptcy legislation was expressed by
Congressman Edwards in his remarks before the House of
Representatives:
Mr. Speaker, the conference report H.R. 5174, Bankruptcy
Amendments of 1984, is regrettable, at best. It ignores over a
decade of study in this issue and creates a maze for debtors,
creditors, and their lawyers who participate in the bankruptcy
process . . . The conference report before us today turns
back the clock, and it does so more than just 6 years by dimin-
ishing the status of bankruptcy judges and their powers from
what they were before the 1978 legislation . . . . Finally, and
very importantly, the jurisdictional powers granted to the bank-
ruptcyjudge and the methods of appointment are not free from
constitutional doubt, which is what got us into this in the first
place under the 1978 compromise.
3 7
His view is shared by many bankruptcy practitioners who believe the
only real solution is to give article III status to bankruptcy judges.
3 8
As Congressman Edwards pointed out, there is concern over the
constitutionality of the provisions which extend the terms of bankruptcy
judges. These terms technically expired on June 27, 1984, the day that
the last Congressional deadline passed without new legislation having
been enacted. One could argue that this congressional extension of au-
thority amounts to appointment of judges by Congress. The appoint-
ment clause 39 of the United States Constitution vests appointment
authority in the executive branch and the judicial branch rather than in
the legislative branch.
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the
adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, ex-
cept personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
35. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(c)(2) (West 1984).
36. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(b)(5) (West 1984).
37. 130 CONG. REC. 7489 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
38. See Norton and Lieb, Ending the Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Dilemma-An Article III Bank-
ruptcy Court Approach, 67 JUDICATURE 346 (1984). But cf. DeMascio, Bankruptcy A Solution In
Search Of A Problem, 67 JUDICATURE 354 (1984) (a separate article III bankruptcy court is
both unnecessary and unwise).
39. [T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Depart-
ments. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
[Vol. 62:1
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William E. Foley, Director of the Adminstrative Office of the United
States Courts, responded to BAFJA just one day after it was signed into
law. He sent a memorandum to all circuit judges, district court judges
and former bankruptcy judges. He stated his concern with the constitu-
tionality of BAFJA and announced his decision not to pay any former
bankruptcy judge purporting to exercise judicial authority under the
new provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 121. He stated:
If the purpose served by the provision is interpreted to be
equivalent to a new appointment of individuals to the offices
they held on June 27, there is a very real possibility, in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
(1976), that the section will be held to be unconstitutional
when challenged. In that event decisions by bankruptcy judges
relying upon section 121 for their grants of judicial authority
may all be invalidated, extensively disrupting the bankruptcy
system and inconveniencing bankruptcy litigants.
40
Since July 10, 1984, the bankruptcy system has been operating
under the jurisdictional provisions of BAFJA. New constitutional chal-
lenges loom on the horizon just months after the Tenth Circuit upheld
in Webb and Colorado Energy Supply the validity of 28 U.S.C. section 1471
(a) and (b) and the jurisdictional system established by the interim oper-
ating rule.
II. DEBTORS' STRICT DUTY TO GIVE FORMAL NOTICE TO CREDITORS
In Reliable Electric Co. v. Olson Construction Co. ,41 the Tenth Circuit
held that the claim of Olson Construction Company, appellee, was not
dischargeable and not subject to the debtor's plan of reorganization be-
cause the debtor, Reliable, had not given Olson sufficient notice of the
bankruptcy confirmation hearing. 4 2 Rejecting Reliable's "fresh start"
argument, the court stated that Olson's guaranteed right to due process
was paramount to the "all encompassing" language of section 114143
40. Memorandum to all circuit, district and former bankruptcy judges, W.E. Foley,
Director, Admin. Office of the United States Courts, July 11, 1984.
41. 726 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1984).
42. Id. at 623.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this section, the provi-
sions of a confirmed plan bind . . . any creditor . . . of. . . the debtor, whether
or not the claim or interest of such creditor . . . is impaired under the plan and
whether or not such creditor . . . has accepted the plan.
(c) After confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and
clear of all claims and interests of creditors . . . except as otherwise provided in
the plan or in the order confirming the plan.
(d)(1) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the plan, or in the
order confirming the plan, the confirmation of a plan-
(A) discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such
confirmation . . . whether or not-
(i) a proof of the claim based on such debt is filed or deemed filed
under section 501 of this title;
(ii) such claim is allowed under section 502 of this title; or
(iii) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan . . ..
1984]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
under the circumstances presented in the case. 44
Olson received actual knowledge of the chapter 1 1 proceedings
through a phone call from Reliable's attorney. Olson was also a defend-
ant and counter-claimant in a breach-of-contract action within the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. Despite the fact that Olson had counterclaimed for
damages, Reliable had failed to schedule Olson as a contingent creditor.
As a result, Olson did not receive notice of the time for filing an accept-
ance or rejection of the reorganization plan, of the confirmation hear-
ing, of the time for filing objections to the confirmation, or of the
confirmation and discharge of Reliable. After confirmation of the plan
and after judgment for Olson in the breach of contract action, Reliable
moved the court to allow thejudgment as a prepetition unsecured claim.
By doing so, the claim would be subject to the confirmed plan of reor-
ganization and, therefore, dischargeable. 4 5 Under the plan, class four
unsecured debt was substantially impaired, and Olson would have been
forced to share in the distribution to the class four unsecured creditors
on a percentage basis.
Applying the standard of reasonable notice outlined by the United
States Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co. ,46 the Tenth
Circuit held that due process requires that creditors be given notice
which is reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to apprise
them of the pending confirmation and which gives them the opportunity
to present their objections. 47 A creditor who has general knowledge of
a debtor's reorganization proceedings has no duty to inquire about fur-
ther court action. 4 8 A creditor has a "right to assume" that he will re-
ceive all of the notices required by statute before his claim is forever
barred.49 This case should serve as a warning to all debtors and their
attorneys that there is a strict duty to give formal notice of bankruptcy
proceedings to all potential creditors.
III. RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF LAw
A. Child Support: Law in Effect at Time of Filing Determines Dischargeability
At issue in Franklin v. State of New Mexico ex. rel. Department of Human
Services 50 was the dischargeability of child support payments owed to the
State of New Mexico. Franklin, the debtor and appellee, was the alleged
father of an illegitimate child. The State of New Mexico had provided
economic assistance to the child when the debtor failed to pay child sup-
port. The dischargeability of the debt to the State depended on whether
the law in effect at the time of filing the bankruptcy petition or the
44. 726 F.2d at 623 n.6.
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) and (d)(1) (1982).
46. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
47. 726 F.2d at 622.
48. Id. (citing New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293,
297 (1953)). See also In re Intaco Puerto Rico, Inc., 494 F.2d 94, 99 (1st Cir. 1974); In re
Harbor Tank Storage Co., 385 F.2d 111, 115 (3d Cir. 1967).
49. 726 F.2d at 622.
50. 730 F.2d 86 (10th Cir. 1984).
[Vol. 62:1
BANKRUPTCY LA W
amended law in effect at the time of the hearing on dischargeability
should apply. 5 1 The Tenth Circuit held that the date of filing is determi-
native. 52 In doing so, it followed the rule under Bradley v. Richmond
School Board,5 3 which dictates that a court must apply the law in effect at
the time it renders its decision unless doing so would result in manifest
injustice or unless there is statutory or legislative history to the con-
trary. 54 The Tenth Circuit balanced the nature of the parties, the nature
of their rights and the resulting impact the change in the law had on
those rights, and determined that an injustice would result if the dis-
charge law were applied restrospectively. 5 5 The court pointed out that
the Bankruptcy Act provides a legislative scheme in which the time of
filing is determinative of many substantial rights. 56 The court also
noted the absence of language within the 1981 amendment to the Code
which would indicate a legislative intent that the amendment apply
retrospectively.
5 7
B. "Gap Period" Liens
The Tenth Circuit decision In re Groves 58 involved a consolidation
of four cases in which debtors attempted to avoid nonpossesory, non-
purchase-money liens on certain property pursuant to section
522(f)(2). 59  The issue decided in each case was whether section
522(0(2) applied to "gap period" liens. The court defined a "gap pe-
riod" lien as a lien created "after the enactment but before the effective
date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978."60 The bankruptcy court
held that application of section 522(f)(2) to such liens would impair
vested property rights and therefore violate due process. The United
States, intervenor in the bankruptcy proceedings, appealed directly to
the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit adopted the analysis of the Ninth
Circuit in In re Webber 6 1 and reversed. In Webber, the Ninth Circuit found
that Congress intended that section 522(0(2) should apply to gap pe-
riod liens and that application of section 522(f)(2) to such liens did not
violate due process because creditors acquiring liens during the gap pe-
51. Prior to October 1, 1979, support obligations owed to the state were nondis-
chargeable. This type of debt became dischargeable after that date pursuant to the 1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act, II U.S.C. § 52 3 (a)(5). On August 13, 1981, the Code was
amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat.
357 § 2334(b) and (c) to again disallow the discharge of this type of debt.
52. 730 F.2d at 87.
53. 416 U.S. 696 (1974).
54. Id. at 697.
55. 730 F.2d at 87-88.
56. Id. at 87. For example, rights pertaining to the operation of the automatic stay,
the evaluation of secured claims, and the determination of what constitutes property of the
estate are determined as of the date of filing. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 506 and 541 (1982).
57. 730 F.2d at 87 (citing Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-35, § 2334(c), 95 Stat. 863 (1981)).
58. 707 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1983).
59. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1982).
60. 707 F.2d at 452. The "gap period" extends from Nov. 6, 1978, the date of enact-
ment, through October 1, 1979, the effective date. Id. at 452 n.l.
61. 674 F.2d 796 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982).
1984]
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riod had notice of the future effect of the Act.6 2
Judge Barrett, dissenting in Groves, refused to put the creditors "on
notice" of section 522(f)(2) until the effective date of the Act. 6 3 He ar-
gued that the creditors' security interests in the property of the debtors
were property interests which could not be taken without due process of
law. Judge Barrett criticized the majority opinion for imputing notice to
creditors from the date of enactment, and supported the prospective ap-
plication of new law where Congress is silent on retroactive
application.
64
The holding of the Tenth Circuit in Groves,65 decided May 16, 1983,
and in Franklin,6 6 decided March 26, 1984, are inconsistent regarding
retroactive application of new law. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
provided that the majority of its provisons would take effect on October
1, 1979. There was no provision for any section to be retroactively ap-
plied, yet the majority in Groves found retroactive application to be "in-
tended."' 6 7 In contrast, the majority opinion in Franklin noted that the
effective date of the Code amendment was the date of enactment and
thus found an intent for prospective application. The Franklin majority
stated, "[t]his court generally disfavors retrospective application of a law
without a clear expression of legislative intent .... .68
At best, the Groves decision will create only minimal confusion re-
garding whether the enactment date or effective date controls the vari-
ous provisions of the Reform Act of 1978. At worst, if liberally
interpreted, Groves could render meaningless statutory effective dates.
The general rule, however, as quoted by dissenting Judge Barrett,
should still prevail: "Acts of Congress are generally to be applied uni-
formly throughout the country from the date of their effectiveness
onward."
69
IV. IMPACT OF STATE LAW ON FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY LAW
A. Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
In In re Colorado Corp. ,70 the limited partners of Green Mountain 69
(Green Mountain) sued The Colorado Corporation (TCC) for additional
distributions from the liquidation of Green Mountain. Green Mountain
was formed to finance drilling operations on Green Mountain proper-
ties, and TCC was its general partner. The 1969 limited partnership
agreement provided that certain payments be made by each of the lim-
62. Id. at 804.
63. 707 F.2d at 453 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
65. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
67. 707 F.2d at 452.
68. 730 F.2d at 87 (citing Edgar v. Fred Jones Lincoln-Mercury of Oklahoma, Inc.,
524 F.2d 162 (10th Cir. 1975)).
69. Groves, 707 F.2d at 553 (Barrett, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Estate of
Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 294 (1974)).
70. No. 81-2177 (10th Cir. filed June 20, 1983).
[Vol. 62:1
BANKRUPTCY LA W
ited partners to provide capital for drilling. When the plaintiffs de-
faulted on their final payments, TCC purchased their interests as
provided by the agreement. The limited partnership agreement was
then amended to reflect the modified list of partners and their capital
contributions.
When TCC was adjudicated bankrupt, the limited partners of Green
Mountain filed for reclamation of their share of the Green Mountain
mineral interests (Green Mountain-i). In response, the trustee at-
tempted to reject the limited partnership agreement as an executory
contract. The limited partners then filed a stipulation of facts which ac-
knowledged the purchase by TCC of the interests of certain defaulting
limited partners. 7' The bankruptcy court held that the limited partner-
ship agreement was not executory and had been fully performed with all
monies having been paid. The court also held that TCC, as general
partner, could wind up the affairs of the limited partnership and liqui-
date its assets. Green Mountain was subsequently liquidated, and the
proceeds were distributed according to the interests set out in the
amended limited partnership agreement. At that time, the limited part-
ners raised no objection to the distribution; however, in 1978, they filed
an action for an accounting. This second action for an accounting,
Green Mountain-2, was appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
In Green Mountain-2, the bankruptcy court granted the trustee's
motion for summary judgment, finding plaintiffs' claim barred by res
judicata. The district court affirmed, 72 finding that the underlying facts
and issues relevant to the holding in the reclamation proceeding, Green
Mountain- 1, were the same facts and issues which the defaulting limited
partners were attempting to relitigate in their claim for an accounting in
Green Mountain-2. The limited partners argued before the Tenth Cir-
cuit that there was no similarity of issues of fact between the actions; that
there was not a full and fair opportunity to litigate the accounting in
Green Mountain-1; that there was no threat of inconsistency of rulings;
and that the limited partners were not on notice that the facts pertinent
to the repurchase were necessary to the determination of Green Moun-
tain- 1.73
The Tenth Circuit addressed each of the limited partners' argu-
ments and concluded that to rule in their favor would contradict the
central holding in Green Mountain-i (that the limited partnership
agreement was not executory and that TCC had fully performed by pay-
71. The limited partners filed a stipulation of facts which stated in part:
By amendment, dated January 31, 1971, and recorded in Denver, Colorado, on
February 11, 1971, the certificate of limited partnership for Green Mountain-69
was amended to reflect that as of October 26, 1970, pursuant to the default and
repurchase provisions of the Partnership Agreement, certain defaulting Limited
Partners had sold their interest to TCC so that TCC had contributed $294,271.66
of the $798,600 required of the Limited Partners, and thereby re-acquired ap-
proximately 37% of ten Limited Partners' 30% interest . ...
Colorado Corp., No. 81-2177, slip op. at 4.
72. No. CIV 81-F-402 (D.C. Colo. filed August 31, 1981).
73. Colorado Corp., No. 81-2177, slip op. at 6.
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ing all monies as set forth in the amended agreement and as stipulated
by the plaintiffs). In response to the limited partners' argument that the
application of res judicata against them was unfair, the circuit court
quoted the United States Supreme Court in Federated Department Stores,
Inc. v. Moitie,7 4 stating that "[t]he doctrine of res judicata serves vital
public interests beyond any individual judge's ad hoc determination of
the equities in a particular case."
'75
The Tenth Circuit also addressed the application of collateral es-
toppel in Goss v. Goss. 76 A state court determined that the obligations
embodied in the debtor's divorce decree were in the nature of mainte-
nance and support and, therefore, were nondischargeable under former
Bankruptcy Act section 17a(17). 7 7 In a subsequent bankruptcy proceed-
ing, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma held that
it was not bound by the prior state court judgment. The bankruptcy
court concluded that the judgment awarded in the divorce decree con-
stituted a property settlement, not alimony, and thus was dischargeable.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and held that the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel should have been applied in the bankruptcy proceeding.
78
The court distinguished the application of res judicata (claim pre-
clusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion):79 "[w]hereas res
judicata forecloses all that which might have been litigated previously,
collateral estoppel treats as final only those questions actually and nec-
essarily decided in a prior suit."' 80 The court also recognized that appli-
cation of these concepts may differ if the bankruptcy court has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine dischargeability as opposed to concurrent ju-
risdiction with state courts.
8 1
The United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Felsen 82 held that res
judicata does not prevent a bankruptcy court from going beyond the
judgment and record of a prior state court proceeding to determine
debt dischargeability under section 17a(2) and (4) of the former Act.
83
In Goss, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Brown because in that case the
dischargeability of debt had been under the exclusive juridiction of the
bankruptcy court; also Brown dealt only with resjudicata, explicitly leav-
ing open the question of whether collateral estoppel should apply to a
state court judgment in the face of exclusive jurisdiction in the bank-
74. 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
75. Id. at 401.
76. 722 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1983).
77. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1976) (repealed 1978).
78. 722 F.2d at 604.
79. See generalty M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 234-41 (2d ed. 1979).
80. 722 F.2d at 602 (quoting Brown v. Felsen 442 U.S. 127, 139 n.10 (1979)).
81. Section 17c(2) of the 1976 Bankruptcy Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to bank-
ruptcy courts to determine dischargeability of debts under § 17a(2), (4) and (8). 11 U.S.C.
§ 35(a)(2), (4), (8) (1976). State courts possess jurisdiction concurrent with that of the
bankruptcy courts to determine dischargeability, with respect to other classes of debts
under § 17a, including debts for alimony or maintenance and support under § 17a(7). 722
F.2d at 602.
82. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
83. Id. at 138.
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ruptcy court.8 4 The Tenth Circuit did not rule on whether, within its
jurisdiction, collateral estoppel should apply in a dischargeability deter-
mination involving a bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction. The cir-
cuits are divided on this question.8 5 In a situation where the states have
been granted concurrent jurisdiction, however, collateral estoppel will
apply when, as in this case, the elements of collateral estoppel are
satisfied.
8 6
B. Constitutionality of Colorado Bankruptcy Exemptions
In Hinkson v. Pfleiderer,8 7 the Tenth Circuit addressed the constitu-
tionality of the Colorado bankruptcy exemptions. Hinkson, a chapter 7
debtor, claimed certain federal exemptions provided by section
522(d).8 8 The trustee objected. In response, Hinkson challenged the
constitutionality of Colorado Revised Statutes section 13-54-107 which
in part denies section 522(d) exemptions to Colorado citizens pursuant
to an option in the Code.8 9 He claimed the provision in the second
sentence of the two-sentence statute offended the supremacy clause 9 °
because it prevented him from claiming certain "nonbankruptcy exemp-
tions," meaning those not contained in section 522(d) but provided by
other federal and state laws.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the bankruptcy court's ruling that Hink-
son could not claim the federal exemptions contained in section 522(d)
because Colorado had "opted out" of providing its citizens such an ex-
emption.9 ' The Tenth Circuit also held that Hinkson lacked standing to
84. Id. at 139, n.10.
85. Some courts have held that collateral estoppel does apply in this situation. See,
e.g., In re Rahm, 641 F.2d 755, 756 n.2, 757 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 860 (1981)
(§ 17a(8); In re Kasler, 611 F.2d 308, 309-10 (9th Cir. 1979) (§ 17a(8). Other courts, how-
ever, have applied collateral estoppel where the issue was previously litigated by the par-
ties in state court, despite the existence of exclusive jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court.
See, e.g., Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 227 (6th Cir. 1981) (§ 17a(8), In re Ross, 602
F.2d 604, 607-08 (3d Cir. 1979) (§ 17a(2).
86. The elements of collateral estoppel are:
(1) The issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical with the issue
in the present action.
(2) There must have been a final judgment rendered.
(3) The party against whom an issue is to be precluded must have been a party
or in privity with a party in the prior case.
(4) The party against whom the doctrine is asserted must have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate in the prior case.
(5) The determination of the issue was essential to the judgment.
See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS at 682-85 (4th ed. 1983).
87. 729 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1984).
88. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1982).
89. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-54-107 (Supp. 1984) reads:
The exemptions provided in section 552(d) of the federal bankruptcy code of
1978 (Title II of the United States Code), as amended, are denied to residents of
this state. Exemptions authorized to be claimed by residents of this state shall be
limited to those exemptions expressly provided by the statutes of this state.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-54-102 (Supp. 1984) lists the exemptions which substitute for the
federal § 522(d) exemptions.
90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
91. This ruling is consistent with the position taken by other circuits. See, First Nat'l
Bank of Mobile v. Norris, 701 F.2d 902, 904 (1lth Cir. 1983); In re Sullivan, 680 F.2d
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challenge a part of the Colorado statute which did not affect him;
although Hinkson challenged the constitutionality of the second sen-
tence of section 13-54-107, it was the first sentence which denied him
the federal exemption. The Tenth Circuit noted that it was a "close
question" whether the Colorado statute precludes a debtor from claim-
ing other federal non-code exemptions.
92
The Colorado bankruptcy court has since ruled on the constitution-
ality of the second sentence. On June 24, 1984, in Ranes v. Molen,
9 3
Judge Brumbaugh of the United States Bankruptcy Court, for the Dis-
trict of Colorado, held the Colorado statute did not deny "nonban-
kruptcy exemptions" to its citizens. The parties have not appealed the
decision.
C. Releasing a Joint Tortfeasor-Effect on Dischargeability of Debt
In LeaseAmercia Corp. v. Eckels,94 the Eckels were the owners and de-
velopers of an equestrian facility. They entered into a lease agreement
with LeaseAmerica whereby LeaseAmerica would purchase a sound sys-
tem and portable stalls and lease them to the Eckels. The sound system
was purchased from David Beatty. Beatty quoted the price of the sound
system as $18,484 in a letter to LeaseAmerica. The actual cost of the
sound system was $7,810. LeaseAmerica paid the $18,484 to the Eckels,
who in turn paid Beatty for the system and retained $10,674.
LeaseAmerica also paid Harold Krug $183,200 for the portable stalls.
The stalls actually cost $159,600. Krug remitted $23,600 to the Eckels.
Evidence indicated that the Eckels participated in both transactions in-
tentionally and without the knowledge or consent of LeaseAmerica.
The Eckels later filed a chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy. LeaseAmerica
filed a complaint contesting the dischargeability of the $10,674 and
$23,600 debts. The bankruptcy court in Kansas held that these debts
were nondischargeable because they constituted a willful and malicious
conversion of funds.
LeaseAmerica also sued David Beatty for the $10,674 in Missouri
state court. More than a year and a half after the bankruptcy court had
held the debt nondischargeable as to the Eckels, LeaseAmerica and
Beatty entered into a compromise settlement. Under the settlement,
Beatty agreed to pay LeaseAmercia $3,750 and court costs, and
LeaseAmercia gave Beatty a complete and unconditional release. Just a
month after the settlement, the federal district court in Kansas affirmed
the bankruptcy court's holding that the debts were nondischargeable.
The Eckels responded by filing a motion for relief from judgment
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) and (6). 95 They argued
1131, 1132 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Canaday, 653 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 1981); see generally 3
COLLIER ON BANKR. 522.02 at 522-11 (15th ed. 1983) (listing states which do not provide
522(d) exemptions).
92. 729 F.2d at 699.
93. 31 Bankr. 70 (Colo. 1983).
94. 710 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1983).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) and (6). The rule provides in pertinent part:
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that the compromise settlement with a full release effectuated by
LeaseAmerica and Beatty constituted the unconditional release of ajoint
tortfeasor, and that, under Kansas law, the unconditional release of one
tortfeasor acts as an unconditional release of all joint tortfeasors. In de-
nying the Eckels' motion for relief from judgment, the district court rea-
soned that the agreement between LeaseAmerica and Beatty did not
affect that part of the indebtedness found nondischargeable by the bank-
ruptcy court. The district court emphasized the Eckels' "willful and ma-
licious conversion" of the funds and refused to excuse the Eckels from
accountability.
9 6
The Tenth Circuit, finding no manifest abuse of discretion on the
part of the district court, affirmed. In the opinion, Judge Barrett noted
several relevant facts: Beatty was sued in Missouri while the bankruptcy
was filed in Kansas; the Eckels were not parties to the Missouri lawsuit
and did not appear therein; and the Eckels were not represented by
counsel in the Missouri proceedings. Judge Barrett reasoned that
"[n]othing in the record .. .support[ed] the Eckels' bald assertion that
they were actually joint tortfeasors in the Missouri action or that the
settlement and release in full effectuated between the parties in Missouri
was binding upon the federal district court in Kansas for purposes of
evaluating a rule 60(b) motion." 9 7 The opinion implies that the willful
and malicious conversion of funds is the heart of the matter. The court
stated: "We concur in the district court's observation that 'to grant the
relief requested would mean that the Eckels would be excused from any
accountability despite their 'willful and malicious conversion' of funds-
the very act which under the law made the indebtedness
nondischargeable.' "98
The LeaseAmerica opinion is unclear as to whether facts, legal princi-
ples or equitable considerations governed the Tenth Circuit's holding.
The opinion does not indicate whether a release prior to a determina-
tion of nondischargeability or prior to a bankruptcy petition would re-
verse the holding. Absent more detailed reasoning, it is difficult to
determine what impact state laws governing the release of joint
tortfeasors may have upon the nondischargeability of debts falling
under section 523(a)(b).
V. GOOD FAITH PROPOSALS IN A CHAPTER 13 PLAN
In Flygare v. Boulden, 99 the debtors' first proposed chapter 13 plan
was denied confirmation, and the case was dismissed. Three months
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: . . . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of thejudgment. ...
96. 710 F.2d at 1475.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 709 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir. 1983).
1984]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
later the debtors filed a second petition which was similar to the first.
The debtors' second proposed plan called for payment to the trustee of
$106 per month for five years. Under the plan, unsecured creditors
would receive approximately one to two percent of their claims. The
bankruptcy court again refused to confirm the plan. At issue was
whether payment to unsecured creditors of one or two percent of the
debts owed them would satisfy the good faith requirement of section
1325(a)(3).1 0 0 Controversies concerning good faith under chapter 13
resulted in more litigation than almost any other issue during the year
immediately following the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code. 0 1
The court in Flygare noted that the various bankruptcy court inter-
pretations of the "good faith" requirement fall into three broad catego-
ries. One interpretation requires substantial or meaningful repayment
in all cases. 10 2 The second interpretation requires only that creditors
receive as much as they would receive under chapter 7.103 The third
interpretation, a "middle road" approach, inquires on a case by case
basis into whether the plan abuses the provisions, purpose or spirit of
chapter 13. The Tenth Circuit joined six other circuits 10 4 in adopting a
formulation of the "middle road" approach and specifically adopted the
factors considered relevant to a determination of good faith by the
Eighth Circuit. 10 5 The court stated, "We agree with the Eighth Circuit
100. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Confirmation of plan.
(a) The court shall confirm a plan if
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbid-
den by law ...
101. 5 COLLIER ON BANKR. 1325.01[2][C] at 1325-8.6 (15th ed. 1983).
102. See, e.g., In re lacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (1982) provides that the court shall confirm the plan if
.. the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the
plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would be
paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title
on such date."
104. In re Kitchens, 702 F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir.
1982); In re Deans, 692 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Barnes, 689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir.
1982); In re Goeb, 675 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d 426 (7th Cir.
1982).
105. See In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982). The factors are:
(I) the amount of the proposed payments and the amount of the debtor's
surplus;
(2) the debtor's employment history, ability to earn and likelihood of future
increases in income;
(3) the probable or expected duration of the plan;
(4) the accuracy of the plan's statements of the debts, expenses and percentage
repayment of unsecured debt and whether any inaccuracies are an attempt
to mislead the court;
(5) the extent of preferential treatment between classes of creditors;
(6) the extent to which secured claims are modified;
(7) the type of debt sought to be discharged and whether any such debt is non-
dischargeable in Chapter 7;
(8) the existence of special circumstances such as inordinate medical expenses;
(9) the frequency with which the debtor has sought relief under the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act;
(10) the motivation and sincerity of the debtor in seeking Chapter 13 relief; and
(11) the burden which the plan's administration would place upon the trustee.
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that '[a] per se minimum payment requirement to unsecured creditors as
an element of good faith would infringe on the desired flexibility of
Chapter 13 and is unwarranted.' "106 The Tenth Circuit reversed and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Congress has recently responded to the litigation which has cen-
tered around the good faith issue. The Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,107 enacted July 10, 1984 amended sec-
tion 1325(b) to provide that, upon objection by the trustee or by the
holder of an allowed unsecured claim, the court cannot confirm the plan
unless the claims are to be paid in full, or unless all of the debtor's pro-
jected disposable income in the subsequent three year period will be
applied under the plan. Disposable income is that income in excess of
what is reasonably necessary for support of the debtor and dependents,
or, if the debtor is in business, that which is necessary for the preserva-
tion, conservation and operation of the business. If a debtor has no ex-
cess income over necessary expenses, then it is possible to make a zero
payment to unsecured creditors.
One likely result of this new provision is that the trustee and inter-
ested parties will scrutinize the budget of the debtor more carefully than
in the past. Accordingly, courts will be asked to decide if a debtor's
budget is reasonable. It is not clear at present what dollar amount or
what budget items the courts will find reasonably necessary for support.
It is also unclear what standard of reasonableness will apply.
Some inequity is likely to result in the application of the new provi-
sion because the excess disposable income paid into the plan can go
toward payment of attorneys' fees, tax and priority claims, secured
claims and unsecured claims. The debtor who has secured debt or taxes
to pay under the plan will pay less to unsecured creditors than a debtor
with the same amount of excess disposable income who has no secured
debt or taxes due. The debtor with a secured debt will, in effect, be
purchasing something through the plan rather than making any repay-
ment to unsecured creditors while meeting the new statutory provisions.
Although at first glance the new section 1325(b) appears to provide
unsecured creditors with more meaningful repayment than under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, there still exists the potential for debt-
ors to structure their budgets and plans in order to minimize repayment
to unsecured creditors. While Congress has attempted to reduce the
abuses which occurred under the chapter 13 provisions of the 1978 Act,
the amendment to section 1325 may well be subjected to as much litiga-
tion as its predecessor has been in the past.
Sally Herron Zeman
106. 709 F.2d at 1348 (quoting In re Estus, 695 F.2d at 316 (footnotes omitted)).
107. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). See also supra text accompanying notes
31-40.
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